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Conversation on Paul Oslington’s Deus Economicus 
*     *     *     *     * 
Editor’s Note: Tony Kelly and Neil Ormerod respond to Paul Oslington’s Deus 
Economicus proposal, a Feature Article of this same issue of AEJT. Finally, Paul 
Oslington responds to his respondents. 
*     *     *     *     * 
Deus Economicus OR Economia Dei? 
Anthony Kelly CSsR 
 
1. As the smart remark has it, “the economy is too important to be left to 
economists”.  A suitable riposte from economists would be, of course, that 
theology is too important to be left to theologians. Still, each discipline knows 
something; hence, the need for the conversation between the two, even if an 
able translator will be necessary, given the divergence of the languages 
involved.  Fortunately, Paul Oslington is one such translator, and his 
appearance in this journal promises a continuing conversation between 
theology and economics, and the promotion of interdisciplinary collaboration. 
 
2. My response to PO’s article is theological, since I would be irresponsible on 
my part to pretend to any economic expertise.  On the other hand, I realize 
that theology needs good economic connections if it is to promote loving one’s 
neighbour as oneself: loving the other without learning from economics could 
be disastrous.  Any human or Christian concern for a just world order, for the 
good functioning of society, for the promotion of the common good along with 
realistic care for the impoverished, needs all the help it can get.  
 
3. PO mentions a recent upsurge of interest in religion on the part of 
economists. Certainly, whether welcome or not, there has been great 
“religious” interest in economics, especially in Church circles. There is an 
impressive body of social teaching in papal encyclicals, for instance, which 
appeals to some kind of economic underpinning and outcome. More 
inspirationally, the strenuous output of Liberation theologians is not without its 
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economic convictions.  To that degree, theology is in its own way massively 
involved in economics.  But here there is a choice for the theologian: either to 
learn from the best of what economics can offer, or create one’s own “lay” 
version of it—with the dismal possibility of being nothing but uninformed 
moralizing. 
 
4. Any discipline or any conversation between different disciplines tends to 
develop in new ways when a crisis occurs.  The economic oppression of 
whole post-colonial populations in Central and South America sparked and 
still fans the flame of Liberation theology in all its forms.  The present 
extraordinary breakdown—the Global Financial Crisis—is not without its 
economic and theological interest.  What kind of reality have we been living? 
What were the economic presuppositions?  What, if any, were the theological 
presuppositions?  It can be expected that theology will join in the stern chorus 
of denunciation of the greed and even the lack of intelligence that are 
apparent.  But how might theology assist in the promotion of something more 
positive? This is where concerned, and, ideally, theologically attuned, 
economists come in—as is the case with PO.   
 
5. Theology as was once described by St Anselm as “faith seeking 
understanding”.  That formula has been endlessly repeated and translated 
into all kinds of contexts: how does faith seek its best, say, scientific 
understanding in the light of Big Bang Cosmology?  Its best ecological 
understanding in when an environmental crisis threatens?  Its best political 
understanding in a post-Marxist world?  Its best economic understanding in a 
neo-capitalist world?  Its best psychological understanding in a post-Freudian 
world?  Its best historical understanding after two World Wars, after the 
horrors of Auschwitz, the Killing Fields of Cambodia and Rwanda, the 
continuing conflicts in the Middle East—and so on, through the interminable 
list of evils and crises that could be added? 
 
6. I presume professional and academic economists are most intent on a 
system that would most favour the sustainable production and circulation of 
goods and services needed for human flourishing.   Theology, for its part, 
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seeks economic understanding—by learning from economists—that most 
accords with what early patristic theology referred to as the divine economia –
that is, God’s saving design for the whole of creation.  Here, a theologian 
assumes that the interests of economists, being first of all human beings, and 
in many cases people of religious faith, hope and charity, as well being as 
specialists in a complex domain of human living, would converge with typical 
theological/ church concerns for a genuinely inclusive common good—
especially for those who tend to be left out in the dominant social, political or 
economic arrangements. 
 
7. These remarks lead into large methodological issues for both theology and 
economics. I mentioned above the open-ended range of interdisciplinary 
possibilities for theology if it is to be genuinely “faith seeking understanding”.  
It cannot close itself off from other ranges of concerns, and learning from 
other methods of understanding.  The data of human existence are manifold, 
depending on one’s interest in investigating, say, religious meaning and 
values, social structures, history-determining events, the structure of matter, 
society’s institutions, the dynamics of evolution, interpersonal relations, 
aesthetics, philosophy, and in this case, the economy. 
 
8. Theology has come through an intense phase of methodological self-
awareness.  Possibly the best representative of this methodological turn is 
Bernard Lonergan (who in fact had a life-long interest in economics).  He 
conceived of theological method to be “a framework of collaborative 
creativity”, consisting of some eight phases or specialties.  Each specialization 
is focused on a particular stage in the complex process of moving from the 
initial data to communicable results and applications.  Lonergan saw the role 
of theology as mediating the meaning and values of faith to the meaning and 
values of a given cultural matrix.  Theology was never a finished product, but, 
you might say, the ongoing conduct of religious intelligence and responsibility 
in dialogue with others. 
 
9. Such a theological method, however ideal, exhibits a basic common sense: 
Research deals with the data (e.g, the various texts); Interpretation deals with 
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interpreting such (e.g., exegesis); History deals with what was going on in 
times past to yield these kinds of data; Dialectic deals with the often 
conflicting ways in which the past is interpreted.   
 
10. But theology is not only looking back.  It is intent on engaging the present, 
and building for the future. In this respect, Foundations objectifies one’s 
standpoint—religiously, intellectually and ethically; Doctrines articulates the 
“non-negotiables”, or the basic positions that belong to Foundations; 
Systematics attempts to express all this into an overall vision of what 
revelation and faith might mean in a contemporary context; finally 
Communications, as the name implies, is intent on the application of all this in 
practice, above all in the corporate practice of the Church and each Christian 
community in its contemporary milieu. 
 
11. If this mediation of meaning and values of faith is to be realistic, then it 
must engage the economy that structures the world as it is.  But it is all very 
well for theologians to appeal to a sophisticated theological method such as 
Lonergan’s.  The problem for theologians such as myself is to gain some 
familiarity with the method (s) of economics.  Though I tend to get lost when 
PO illustrates the content of his article with mathematical formulae of arresting 
complexity, his article whets my interest in the deeper methodology involved.   
 
12. How, then, does economics represent something akin to theological 
method?  After all, it too deals with specific data, and various ways of 
interpreting such.  Implied is a larger sense of what is going on in history and 
society.  Moreover, economists are not immune to conflicts (socialist, 
Capitalist, Keynesian, etc…).  Decisions are reached as to what is the best 
perspective, and what counts in the overall assessment.  And, of course, it is 
carried through to applications in the market to promote a better production 
and circulation of the goods human beings need. 
 
13.  More particularly, how, then, does economics in general, and PO in 
particular, conceive of the interaction between economics and theology? The 
current data on the economy tend to jolt one, if not to transcendent reflections, 
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at least to deeper musings on what the economy is on about.  But how does 
economics admit theological considerations?  PO allows for some correlation 
by referring to a number of analogies such as “rational choice” and “games 
theory”.  Is the economic reality the measure of the divine economia?  Or, 
does the divine economy offer a horizon in which to interpret the economy?  
Economics seeks its own understanding of the intelligible and practicable in 
the actual ordering of a given (global?) society, to secure a recurring 
availability of necessary goods and services.  Intelligence, planning, and even 
hope for the future are considerations.  We note how the “mood” of the market 
is a defining factor.  How do ultimate commitments, in terms of faith, hope and 
love, enter into the equation? 
 
14. Perhaps it comes down to this: theology implies a reliance of economics if 
it is realistically to communicate the Gospel to society. Economics, for its part, 
would be enclosed in its own quantitative formulae unless it can appeal to 
some sense of the common human good and the transcendent personal and 
communitarian values implied.  But economics offers is own specific 
intelligence and expertise to theology if theology is to make sense in the real 
world of buying and selling, working and producing, of needs, survival and 
flourishing.  But how do the two disciplines interact, overlap, and collaborate?   
 
15. I turn to PO for further light on this major question, since he represents a 
personal instance of how the two disciplines come together in fruitful 
association.   To that degree, he is the living anticipation of the answers to the 
questions we have posed.   
 
16. Yet in another way, PO intensifies a basic question itself.  For theology is 
essentially oriented to the superabundance of the divine Gift; indeed to the 
inexhaustible character of the divine self-giving—in the incarnation, in the 
compassion of the Cross, in the resurrection as the radical overcoming of evil 
in all its form, in the outpouring of the Spirit, and the promise of eternal life.  
Given that sense of the superabundance of the Gift, hope, however costly it 
might be, need put no limits on the love and mercy that has been revealed.   
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17. The divine economia is one of superabundance.  To enter it in faith, hope 
and love is to live in the world “otherwise”.  It is “new creation” compared to 
the “real world” of rational choices, cost-benefit analysis, contracts, market 
supply and demand, limited commodities, the inevitable bias of self-interest 
and the often irrational factors of “confidence” or gloom.  
 
18. Are we dealing, in fact, with mutually incompatible worldviews?  Is further 
conversation possible? PO, in himself, and in the content of this article and 
other writings, surely suggests that there is. 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 
A response to Deus Economicus: Deus gratiae 
Neil Ormerod 
 
Let me begin by welcoming this opportunity for an interdisciplinary dialogue. 
These opportunities are rare events and we all face the difficulty of seeking to 
straddle two distinct fields of discourse – most of us have difficulty enough in 
mastering one. Paul Oslington’s forays into the dialogue between economics 
and theology are to be welcomed, even if we theologians might be baffled by 
the terminology and style of approach that he has adopted. Part of the 
challenge is of course learning the language of the other and seeking to make 
the relevant connections between that language and one’s own.  
 
In responding I would like to focus on a number of issues raised by 
Oslington’s paper which are of theological and philosophical import. My 
comments will be robust, but I hope respectful and help contribute to the 
dialogue between these two disciplines. 
 
The divine rationality 
Oslington makes use of rational choice theory as the starting point for his 
discussion. This is indeed a powerful tool of economic analysis and so he 
argues that it should “equally be applied to divine as well as human action ... 
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any God an economist would take seriously must be rational in the 
economists’ sense ... If anything, God should be more rational than humans”. 
 
Indeed God should be and is more rational than humans. In fact he defines 
what rationality is. And here lies the difficulty. Do we expect God to conform to 
our expectations of rationality or should we seek to conform ourselves to the 
divine rationality? It appears as if Oslington expects God to conform – God 
must be rational “in the economists’ sense”?  Wherein then the biblical insight 
that God’s ways are not our ways, God’s thoughts not our thoughts. And why 
should the economists’ sense of rationality be privileged over that of the 
physicist, the art critic or the novelist? And do even economists construct a 
utility function to weigh the costs and benefits of a choice of life partner? What 
of the reason of the heart that reason does not know (Pascal)? 
 
If we turn to the parables of Jesus, we find a God who acts in the most 
uneconomic of ways. God leaves the ninety nine sheep to find the one that is 
lost. God celebrates the finding of a lost coin, by throwing a party that costs 
more than the coin found. God repudiates the economic logic of the older son 
on the return of the prodigal son. In its place God displays the economics of 
grace, of divine liberality and generosity. And to the day labourers who 
grumbled over their pay God states, “why be angry because I am generous; 
can I not do what I like with what is mine?”. God is simply not ruled by human 
“rational” expectation, but chooses an economy of divine graciousness and 
liberality.  
 
Why does God choose to so act? We might respond by noting that each and 
every human being is made in the image and likeness of God. Each human 
being is capable of his or her own unique response to God’s offer of 
relationship. Each human being is then of infinite and irreplaceable value in 
God’s eyes. Faced with such infinities the mathematics of utility functions 
begins to break down.  
 
The conception of human flourishing 
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Economists have a particular conception of human flourishing. And so 
Oslington speaks of endowments, commodities, scarcity and utility functions. 
Individuals work with their endowments to produce and purchase commodities 
and so to maximise their personal utility. This produces a conception of 
human flourishing in terms of the production and consumption of material 
goods. This is a particularly limited conception, something Oslington 
acknowledges in his concluding comments when he notes that economics 
operates on the assumption of scarcity, whereas religion envisages certain 
non-material (spiritual) goods which are not subject to the constraints of 
scarcity.  
 
It is worth spelling out what this means. A person can aspire to social justice, 
for example. This aspiration is not in competition with others seeking the 
same aspiration – rather they can work together to achieve this good. 
Similarly a person can aspire to virtue, an aspiration which is not competitive 
because there is no economy of scarcity involved. My seeking virtue does not 
impede your seeking virtue or make it more costly. In fact it can assist you in 
seeking the same goal. We can provide encouragement to one another and 
model virtuous behaviour for one another. These goods of human flourishing 
are not commodities which can be bought or sold.  
 
Moreover these goods of human flourishing are not reducible to the material 
goods we decide to buy and sell. The real power of human freedom lies not in 
these external commodities but in the type of person we become through the 
decisions we make. We are the basic good which is the true object of our 
freedom, whether through our decisions we become virtuous or vicious. 
Through our decisions we make ourselves. These higher goods, the virtues 
we embody, are not quantifiable in some material sense; they are spiritual and 
so are not subject to numerical mathematical modelling per se.  
 
Another aspect of the utility function is that it promotes an individualist 
conception of human flourishing. I operate to achieve my own utility. But how 
does this relate to the utility of others? Where is the sense of the 
interconnection of human living? This sense of individualism is increased by 
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Oslington’s assumption that God’s “utility function” as a function of each 
person is separable, that is, each is evaluated independently of others. This it 
seems to me runs counter to Christian notions of our solidarity in sin with 
Adam and with Christ in salvation. Our salvation is not just an individual issue 
but one worked out in a variety of solidarities with others, in sin and grace 
(Romans 5). 
 
This individualism promotes a Pelagian conception of salvation as something I 
achieve through my choices. “If an individual chooses a bundle of 
commodities which is approved by God ... then the individual receives 
salvation”. Again this does not seem to take into account the economy of 
divine graciousness which is revealed in the Gospel. It is God who saves us, 
not something we achieve as such. We are some distance here from Luther’s 
sola fide.  
 
A philosophical point 
The type of modelling employed in rational choice theory is based 
philosophically on the fact-value split introduced into ethical debate by Hume 
and others. Practical rationality is concerned with means, whereas ends are 
inherently irrational and arbitrary. There is no intrinsic connection between the 
ends we choose and the rationality we display is pursuing those ends. The 
ends we choose are merely preferences and it may be “rational” to align our 
preferences with the divine preferences to achieve another “preference” which 
is salvation, but there is no deeper rationality at stake in relation to these 
ends. Even the divine preferences do not appear to have any deeper 
rationality – God simply approves of some and frowns on others.  
 
At the base of this is whether one promotes a thick substantive vision of 
human flourishing or a thin and procedural account. Largely our liberal society 
has abandoned any substantive account in the name of liberalism and 
democracy. People are free in their preferences (as long as they don’t “harm” 
anyone else). Rationality is then about how one attains one ends, not the 
ends themselves (except in a cost-benefit sense). Christianity on the other 
hand has long put forward a substantive account of human flourishing. Some 
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preferences (sins) are ruled out not because of some arbitrary preference on 
God’s part, but because they are intrinsically diminishing of my own good, a 
good which is not just an arbitrary preference on my part, but constitutive of 
my human nature as such.  
 
Now it is true that rational choice theory is proving a useful tool in predicting 
human behaviour in various settings. This success however may well be a 
function of how deeply imbued our society is with the assumptions of the fact-
value split and subsequent procedural accounts of rationality. Such an 
account of rationality “suits” our age, but has no basis to claim to be 
universally normative. It is strongly historically constituted. Indeed one might 
be tempted to suggest that the success of rational choice theory in predicting 
human behaviour is a measure of how far we are from our Christian heritage 
as a society.  
 
Conclusion 
Lonergan has long argued for the need of interdisciplinary dialogue between 
theology and the human sciences. Indeed he goes so far as to suggest that 
the only true form of the human sciences is theological. Still he argues that 
the main contribution of theology to the dialogue will be methodological, that 
is, in identifying the philosophical underpinnings of various approaches in the 
human sciences.1 Economics is one example of a human science, concerned 
with the human actions of production, consumption and exchange. While the 
theological points I make above are important, I think the most significant area 
of dialogue in the first instance lies with the philosophical issues I identify. Let 
the dialogue continue! 
 
                                                 
1 For my own efforts in this regard see Neil Ormerod, "A Dialectic Engagement with 
the Social Sciences in an Ecclesiological Context," Theological Studies 66 (2005), 
815-40. References to Lonergan’s work can be found in this paper.  
 











Paul Oslington’s Response to Tony Kelly and Neil Ormerod 
 
My warm thanks to Anthony Kelly and Neil Ormerod for their responses to my 
somewhat eccentric paper.  I must confess on a couple of occasions to have 
presented it in a somewhat less than serious vein.  Theologians picked this up 
more readily than economist audiences, although in defence of much 
maligned economists this particular group were also Americans.   
   
The exercise does have quite a serious purpose though, which is to push the 
economists rational choice model as far as I can to learn about its strengths 
and limitations in relation to Divine action, and its strengths limitations more 
generally.  The paper’s structure follows a typical rational choice paper in 
economics, building a simple model, deriving testable predictions from the 
model, and then confronting these predictions with data.   
 
Anthony and Neil both comment on the use of mathematics.  By the standards 
of papers in economics it is quite loose, and certainly less mathematical than 
most of my work in mainstream economics.  A major barrier to interdisciplinary 
communication is the different styles of papers in economics and theology, 
and mathematical difficulties many theologians have (Neil excepted of course, 
with his background in mathematics) combined with the discomfort many 
economists have with the literary style of theology.  The style of my paper was 
trying to make this point.  
 
In terms of the value and limits of an economic approach to Divine action, 
Anthony Kelly and Neil Ormerod have nicely taken forward the discussion of 
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some of the issues raised in my conclusion, as well as adding important 
questions of their own.   
 
I don’t agree by the way with Neil’s point about economic models only dealing 
with material goods –commodities entering into a utility function can be 
material or immaterial.  He is right that if any commodities are not subject to 
scarcity they are likely to be immaterial commodities.  Being an immaterial 
though does not necessarily take them out of the realm of scarcity – 
immaterial commodities like education or friendship require scarce resources 
for their production – such as chalk coffee and time.  It could of course be 
debated whether something like friendship, or Neil’s examples of social justice 
and virtue can be helpfully modeled as commodities.  Or if commodities then 
perhaps measurement difficulties make empirical analysis impossible.  Neil is 
right to suggest that if the most important ingredients of human flourishing 
can’t be modeled as commodities then public policy based solely on economic 
modeling will not deliver good outcomes. 
 
I agree completely with Neil’s point about utility functions promoting an 
individualistic conception of human flourishing and perhaps Pelagianism.  
Pushing an economic model this far brings out these faults clearly, and puts 
us on our guard against them in less extreme economic models. 
 
Neil Ormerod suggests that rational choice theory is based on the fact-value 
distinction introduced by Hume.  Economists have been quite attached to a 
fact-value distinction since the middle of the 19th century, but I’m not sure how 
important in influence Hume was in this for economists, nor whether there is a 
necessary relationship between rational choice theorizing and commitment to 
a fact value distinction.  
 
I agree that rational choice theory makes it difficult to examine ends.   A paper 
by the rational choice theorists Stigler and Becker (1977) is the classic 
statement of the irrelevance of beginnings (what lies behind the utility function) 




The point abundance and scarcity is well made by Anthony Kelly, and much 
more fully in a recent book by Kathryn Tanner (2005). She is an expert on the 
Eastern Fathers among whom the discourse of divine economy was most 
developed.  And of course we have the scriptural language of redemption, 
reconciliation, and economy.  To speak of divine economy in this way is a 
challenge to contemporary economic practice.  
 
I have said that I agree with many of Neil Ormerod and Anthony Kelly’s points 
about the inadequacies of rational choice theory.  But the economist who 
wants to use rational choice theory still has a methodological escape route - 
instrumentalism.    The fact that I use a particular sort of model, or that a 
model illuminates reality, does not mean I believe reality (including the reality 
of God) corresponds to that model. I might use several models to eliminate 
different aspects of reality, or to study that reality using different models for 
different purposes. As a very crude generalization economists tend to be 
methodologically instrumentalist, while theologians tend to realists.  This 
perhaps makes some sense in terms of the different objects of the disciplines, 
but it is one of the reasons why economists and theologians so often talk at 
cross purposes.  
 
Before leaving the issue of instrumentalism, which promises to let the rational 
choice economist off the theological hook, a point about the social effects of 
economic modeling must be made.  Economics is a powerful cultural 
influence, especially in Australia, and shapes the way we think about all 
manner of things, from families to schools and hospitals, and even as I have 
noted, how we speak and behave in church.  If economics is culturally 
powerful and economists operate with individualistic models, then this 
individualism rubs off in society, regardless of whether the “it is only a 
scientific tool” the defence saves the economist.  
 
Anthony Kelly asks where the paper fits in the larger economics and theology 
dialogue. I see that the dialogue as made up of at least half a dozen distinct 
conversations:   
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1) A long-standing debate about the influence of religious belief on 
economic behaviour (such as Max Weber’s argument about the role of certain 
Protestant sects in the development of capitalism, and his less well-known 
writings on the economic implications of other religious ideas). 
 
2) Suggestions of an influence of Christian theology on the development 
of economic theory.  I am working mostly on this at the moment, including a 
book for Routledge on the crucial period in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries when economics took shape as the discipline.  It is not exactly a 
crowded conversation, although I can build on the work of distinguished 
contributors such as Jacob Viner and Anthony Waterman. This conversation is 
carried on at the margins of the discipline of economics, especially in history 
economic thought and wider intellectual history communities. 
 
 
3) A conversation about the seepage of modern economic ideas into our 
church practice and even our theology.  It is easy to point the finger at 
American-style mega-churches, and neglect the less crass but nevertheless 
powerful transformation of the way mainstream churches have operated 
through this period of the cultural ascendancy of economics. 
 
4) A related conversation about the appropriateness of churches business 
activities, and of church related organisations delivering various social 
services through government contracts. It is a very important public policy 
debate in Australia at the moment, and one to which theologians and 
economists can fruitfully contribute. 
 
5) Rational choice economic explanations of religious behaviour and 
religious institutions. This is an extremely active area in economics at the 
moment, with papers appearing in top economics journals and the formation 
of new societies and conferences. Larry Iannaccone, who visited Australia a 
couple of years ago with funds from a previous Templeton foundation grant, 
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has been a key figure in the rise of the economics of religion.  My paper in one 
sense slots into this literature, as explained in the introduction.  
 
6) Religious economics.  Since the separation of economics from 
Christian theology in the middle of the 19th century in Britain, and the early 
20th century in America there have been various attempts to reconstruct a 
religious economics.  Neo-Calvinists drawing inspiration from Abraham 
Kuyper have been prominent contributors, and joined it lately by some Roman 
Catholic scholars trying to do the same through Aristotle and Thomas 
Aquinas.  I am involved in a session on this next January at the American 
Economic Association annual meeting.  Such discussions remain even more 
marginal in economics than the historical conversation.  There is probably 
more interest in these reconstruction projects among theologians than 
economists.  
 
I have surveyed and collected important contributions to the field  in a two-
volume reference work Economics and Religion (Oslington (2003).   
 
Both Anthony Kelly and Neil Ormerod mention Bernard Lonergan.  I don't have 
their depth of knowledge of Lonergan’s system, but there do seem to be 
similarities between his approach to interdisciplinary work and mine. I look 
forward to learning more from discussions with them and others about 
Lonergan’s system. Working out what exactly Lonergan was trying to do in his 
writings on economics (Lonergan 1999; 2002) is a project for the future,   and 
others at Australian Catholic University including Neil I know are interested in 
this. To make progress I think we need to bring together historians of 
economic thought, macroeconomists and theologians.    
 
In my own interdisciplinary work I was influenced by reading Weber, 
Heidegger and Gadamer for my University of Sydney MEc thesis, by a 
sabbatical at Oxford where I was introduced to the history of science and the 
science and religion dialogue, and the writings and example of theologically 
astute economists such as Donald Hay, David Richardson, Anthony 
Waterman, and Geoffrey Brennan.   The initial motivation was working out 
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how to put together my own work as professional economist and Christian 
faith.   My approach has been worked out mostly through trial and error as I’ve 
undertaken interdisciplinary work, with the benefit of comments from 
economist colleagues, and more recently historians and theologians.   
 
Anthony Kelly in paragraphs 14 and 15 gives his own very helpful summary of 
how the disciplines depend on each other.  And he highlights the personal 
dimension.  I find it fascinating to observe the choices that theologically 
sensitive economist colleagues make about how they put together their 
professional work and Christian faith.  A professional life devoted to 
mainstream economic research and teaching is a statement about the 
relationship between economics and theology. It expresses a separation 
between economic and theological discourse more powerfully than an article 
written in the journal like Faith and Economics, or the Journal of the UK 
Association of Christian Economists.  For Christian economist colleagues who 
don't accept the separation I’m fascinated by how exactly their views are 
disclosed in their professional work.  After all, only a small subset of 
economists of Christian faith ever write about the relationship.  
 
Why does this sort of discussion matter?  Readers of the Australian e-journal 
of Theology, even those interested (and perhaps especially those interested) 
in issues of poverty and economic justice may wonder why may wonder why 
space is devoted to debating obtuse points of economic theory and examining 
economists professional lives.  Why can't we just get on with advocacy and 
action?  Anthony Kelly's caution about the dangers of uninformed moralizing 
applies here, but the further point I'd like to make is that when theologians do 
take the trouble informing themselves about economic issues their questions 
and structure of their answers are greatly influenced by economic theory.  It 
may be economic theory they picked up in earlier studies, conversations with 
friends and colleagues, and reading general books.  A theoretical framework 
may only be dimly recognized, but it is always there. An aim of the sort of 
exercise that myself and Anthony Kelly and Neil Ormerod (2005) are engaged 
in here is to clarify and correct the economic models that we cannot avoid 
bringing to debates about poverty and economic justice.  
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I am satisfied that the paper has provoked these responses which open up 
many of the issues at stake in the economics and theology dialogue, and 
again express my appreciation to Anthony Kelly and Neil Ormerod  who I am 





Lonergan, B. (1999). Macroeconomic Dynamics: An Essay in Circulation 
Analysis. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan Volume 15 Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press. 
 
Lonergan, B. (2002). For a New Political Economy. Collected Works of 
Bernard Lonergan Volume 23 Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 
 
Ormerod, N. (2005). “A Dialectic Engagement with the Social Sciences in an 
Ecclesiological Context.” Theological Studies 66: 815-40. 
 
Oslington, P., Ed. (2003).  Economics and Religion. International Library of 
Critical Writings in Economics Cheltenham, Edward Elgar  2 volumes. 
 
Stigler, G. J. and G. S. Becker (1977). “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum.” 
American Economic Review  67 2: 76-90. 
 
Tanner, K. (2005). Economies of Grace Minneapolis, Fortress Press. 
 
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
 
BIO: Paul Oslington, Anthony Kelly and Neil Ormerod are all Professors at  





           
 
